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Memorandum  to  the  Government  of  the 
Unitbd  States  on  the  Recognition  of 
the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic. 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C, 
19  20 


Memorandum  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  on  the  Recognition  of 
the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic. 


lirjuan.  \--n«>K'l 


1  920 
PUBLISHED  BY 

FRIENDS  OF  UKRAINE 

345   MUNSEY   BUILDING 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


UKRAINIAN  MISSION 
Washington,  D.  C. 

May  12,  1920. 
The  Honorable,  The  Secretary  of  State, 

Department  of  State,  Washington. 
Sir: 

In  view  of  the  present  status  in  eastern  Europe,  and 
in  deference  to  the  unsettled  affairs  of  the  territory  of 
the  former  Eussian  empire,  which  are  now  pressing  for 
a  definite  solution,  I,  as  the  representative  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Ukrainian  People  *s  Eepublic,  conceive 
it  to  be  my  duty  to  submit  for  your  consideration  this 
memorandum  setting  forth  the  just  claims  of  the 
Ukrainian  people  to  political  and  economic  indepen- 
dence. As  a  consequence  of  the  facts  herein  explained, 
I  respectfully  ask  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
of  America  to  extend  recognition  to  the  Ukrainian 
People's  Eepublic  as  a  free  state. 

The  national  aspirations  of  Ukraine  embrace  politi- 
cal liberation  for  all  Ukrainians,  consolidation  of  all 
free  Ukrainians  into  one  state,  the  erection  of  a  consti- 
tutional democratic  republic,  and  economic  co-opera- 
tion with  neighboring  and  other  states. 

Ukraine's  claim  to  independence  is  based  upon  the 
following  principal  grounds : 

(1)  The  existence  of  the  Ukrainians  as  a  well-de- 
fined, separate,  group-conscious  race,  with  a  continuous 
historic  and  cultural  tradition ; 

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(2)  Their  occupation,  over  a  period  of  centuries,  of 
the  lands  where  they  now  dwell; 

(3)  Their  age-long  efforts,  increasingly  of  popular 
origin,  to  achieve  and  maintain  political  independence ; 

(4)  The  obvious  interest  and  desire  of  the  entire 
Ukrainian  population  to  organize  and  sustain  its 
economic  life  free  of  exploitation  by  neighbors  and 
foreign  powers ;  and 

(5)  The  crying  need  for  a  new  order  in  eastern 
Europe,  and  the  permanent  elimination  of  the  historic 
struggle  between  Poland  and  Russia  to  control  the 
natural  resources  of  Ukraine. 

By  all  the  canons  of  ethnology  and  history,  the 
Ukrainians  form  a  distinct  racial  unit.  In  America 
there  has  been  a  popular  impression  that  Ukraine  is 
merely  a  province  of  Russia,  identified  with  it  linguis- 
tically and  racially.  This  is  a  misapprehension.  The 
leading  anthropologists,  even  among  the  Russians, 
agree  that  the  Ukrainians  constitute  a  physical  type 
clearly  different  from  the  Great  Russians,  the  White 
Ruthenians  or  the  Poles.  In  culture  and  temperament 
they  display  peculiarities  which  permeate  their  whole 
social  and  moral  nature.  Their  language  is  a  separate 
Slavic  tongue,  and  not  merely  a  dialect  of  the  Great 
Russian. 

** Between  Ukrainians  and  Russians,''  says  Sir  Don- 
ald Mackenzie  Wallace,  a  learned  student  of  Russia, 
** there  are  profound  differences  of  language,  customs, 
traditions,  domestic  arrangements,  mode  of  life  and 
communal  organizations.  Indeed,  if  I  did  not  fear  to 
ruffle  unnecessarily  the  patriotic  susceptibilities  of  my 
Great  Russian  friends  who  have  a  pet  theory,  I  should 
say  that  we  have  here  two  distinct  nationalities.  .  .  .'' 

**The  historic  development,''  says  the  official  state- 
ment of  the  Russian  Imperial  Academy  of  Sciences, 


'* contributed  toward  the  creation  of  two  nationalities: 
the  Great  Russian  and  the  Ukrainian.  The  historic 
life  of  the  two  peoples  failed  to  develop  a  common 
language  for  them.  On  the  contrary,  it  really  strength- 
ened those  dialectic  variances  with  which  the  ancestors 
of  the  Ukrainians,  on  the  one  hand,  and  those  of  the 
Great  Russians,  on  the  other,  made  their  appearance  in 
history.  And,  of  course,  the  living  Great  Russian 
idiom,  as  it  is  spoken  by  the  people  of  Moscow,  Riazan, 
Archangel,  Yaroslavl  or  Novgorod  cannot  be  called  a 
^Pan-Russian*  language  as  opposed  to  the  Ukrainian 
of  Poltava,  Kiev  or  Lviv  (Lemberg).'' 

The  Ukrainian  race  is  as  nearly  autocthonous  as  any 
in  central  or  eastern  Europe.  A  brief  survey  of  his- 
tory shows  that,  for  more  than  one  thousand  years,  the 
Ukrainians  and  their  forbears  have  continued  to  occupy 
approximately  the  same  lands  which  they  now  inhabit, 
except  for  temporary  recessions  and  re-colonizations 
caused  by  Mongol  invasions.  In  the  ninth  century 
they  were  already  settled  in  the  vast  and  fertile  plains 
and  woodlands  lying  between  the  Carpathian  Moun- 
tains and  the  Sea  of  Azov,  and  embracing  the  valleys 
of  the  Dniester,  Pruth,  Boh,  Dnieper  and  Donetz. 

Organized  government  in  Ukraine  began  with  the 
ancient  state  of  Kiev.  The  ascendancy  of  Kiev  also 
marks  the  period  of  Ukraine's  greatest  political  ex- 
pansion. From  the  ninth  to  the  thirteenth  century, 
Kiev  was  the  center  of  the  economic,  intellectual  and 
political  life  of  eastern  Europe,  uniting  the  entire 
ethnographic  Ukrainian  territories.  The  name  by 
which  this  state  was  known  was  ^*Russ,''  taken  from 
the  name  of  the  reigning  dynasty.  This  term  was  later 
appropriated  by  the  Great  Russians.  ^*  Because  of  the 
Byzantine  commerce,  learning  and  craft,  *'  observes 
the  Polish  historian  Zakrzewski,  ^^Kiev,  the  ^mother  ol' 


Russ  cities/  was  for  the  Poland  of  the  eleventh  and 
twelfth  centuries  what  Rome  had  been  for  earlier 
Germans/'  The  French  geographer  Reclus  notices 
that  academies  flourished  at  Kiev  and  Ostrog  before 
the  Great  Russians  owned  a  single  high  school,  and 
draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  Russia,  during  the  re- 
generative period  of  Peter  the  Great,  received  her 
teachers  from  Ukraine. 

The  fall  of  Kiev  and  Ukraine's  subsequent  loss  of 
autonomous  statehood  in  the  fourteenth  century  can 
only  be  ascribed  to  the  old  system  of  military  conquest. 
The  affairs  of  eastern  Ukraine  became  confused  and  de- 
cadent through  the  constant  Mongol  pressure  which 
began  in  the  thirteenth  century.  One  hundred  years 
later,  part  of  western  Ukraine  also,  weakened  by  fre- 
quent Tatar  invasions,  fell  a  prey  to  Poland,  to  whom 
she  was  a  tempting  prize  because  of  her  rich  soil. 

The  Polish  conquest  of  Ukraine  started  in  1340  and, 
after  thirty-five  years  of  the  bitterest  warfare,  the 
Poles  succeeded  in  annexing  an  area  of  land  approxi- 
mately coextensive  with  the  present  provinces  of  Kholm 
and  Eastern  Galicia.  This  they  never  succeeded  in  as- 
similating, in  spite  of  the  most  tremendous  efforts. 
Simultaneously  Yolhynia  and  other  northern  Ukrain- 
ian territories  became  confederated  with  Lithuania  in 
order  to  gain  protection  against  the  Tatars.  The  mar- 
riage of  the  Lithuanian  king  to  the  Queen  of  Poland 
and  the  union  of  the  two  realms  drew  these  Ukrainian 
lands  also  in  1386  into  an  informal  union  with  the 
Polish  empire  which,  in  1569,  in  spite  of  Ukrainian  pro- 
tests, was  made  definite,  and  lasted  until  1648. 

In  that  year  the  whole  Ukrainian  people  rose,  under 
the  leadership  of  Bohdan  Khmelnitsky,  and  put  an  end 
to  this  union,  which  was  incompatible  with  their  inter- 
ests and  with  their  type  of  civilization.     Then,  antici- 


pating  further  Polish  efforts  to  destroy  the  newly  won 
independence  of  Ukraine,  and  menaced  by  other  foes, 
particularly  the  Turks,  then  the  strongest  military 
power  in  eastern  Europe,  the  Ukrainians  concluded  an 
agreement  of  confederation  with  the  Czar  of  Muscovy 
in  1654.  It  is  interesting  to  recall  that  Khmelnitsky 
was  expressly  advised  against  this  step  by  Oliver 
Cromwell,  who  declared  that  the  Czar  would  never 
permanently  recognize  a  free  people. 

The  most  important  clauses  in  the  treaty  of  1654 
guaranteed  a  freely  chosen  supreme  head  for  the 
Ukrainian  state,  called  a  **hetman'^;  the  right  to  en- 
gage in  diplomatic  relations  with  other  states,  except 
Poland  and  Turkey,  when  the  cognizance  of  the  Czar 
was  necessary;  free  trade  with  all  foreign  nations ;  the 
complete  independence  of  the  judicial  system;  the 
right  to  choose  a  leader  for  the  army,  over  whom  the 
^^hetman''  had  supreme  control;  and,  lastly,  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Ukrainian  Church. 

Muscovy  did  not  live  up  to  these  terms,  and  the  re- 
sult was  a  succession  of  Ukrainian  uprisings,  directed 
now  against  Russia  just  as  they  had  formerly  been 
aimed  at  Poland.  In  the  last  quarter  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  Eussia  and  Poland  made  common  cause 
and  partitioned  Ukraine,  making  the  Dnieper  the 
frontier  between  their  two  empires.  The  most  import- 
ant rebellion  against  this  last  measure  was  that  led  by 
Mazeppa  in  1709,  which  was  quelled  by  Peter  the  Great. 
After  the  time  of  Mazeppa,  Russia's  policy  of  repres- 
sion was  pursued  openly  and  ruthlessly.  Peter  insti- 
tuted a  supervision  over  the  autonomous  Ukrainian 
administration,  vesting  authority  in  Muscovite  officers, 
through  whose  hands  passed  everything  pertaining 
to  the  hetman's  chancellery.  In  1722  the  power  of  the 
hetmans  was  cut  down  to  nothing.  In  1764  Catherine 
II.  abolished  the  office  altogether. 

7 


Meanwhile,  in  order  to  assure  possession  of 
Ukraine,  the  Russian  government  was  making  every 
effort  to  assimilate  the  Ukrainian  people.  One  step 
toward  accomplishing  this  was  the  suppression  of 
Ukrainian  literature.  In  1720  a  special  censorship 
over  the  publication  of  Ukrainian  books  was  estab- 
lished in  Kiev.  In  1769  even  the  printing  of  Ukrainian 
primers  was  forbidden,  and  Russian  text-books  were 
introduced  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  Ukrainian  edu- 
cators. 

Step  by  step,  national  feeling  was  stifled  in  Ukraine. 
In  1775,  the  ^'Zaporogian  Sitch,''  the  last  bulwark  of 
Ukraine  ^s  autonomy,  and  the  basis  of  the  Ukrainian 
Army,  was  destroyed.  In  1783  the  peasants  of 
Ukraine,  free  since  1648,  when  they  had  thrown  off 
Polish  domination,  were  again  subjected  by  the  Rus- 
sian government  to  serfdom  in  its  most  cruel  form. 
Hundreds  of  thousands  of  free  peasants  and  Cossacks, 
together  with  millions  of  acres  of  Ukrainian  land,  were 
distributed  among  the  favorites  of  Catherine  II. 

This  measure  had  the  effect  of  crushing  the  resist- 
ance to  Russification  among  the  Ukrainian  nobility, 
and  estranged  them  from  the  common  people.  The 
serfdom  of  the  small  farmer  was  so  profitable  for  the 
gentry  that  the  preponderance  of  the  aristocracy  be- 
came superfically  Russian.  Under  pressure  of  Russian 
schooling,  administration  and  military  service,  they 
adopted  the  Russian  language  and  political  ideas.  To 
achieve  this  desirable  result,  the  Muscovite  govern- 
ment did  not  hestitate  to  persecute  ruthlessly  anything 
that  could  be  held  as  a  reminder  of  the  republican 
regime  in  Ukraine.  At  the  same  time,  an  analogous 
Polonization  of  the  upper  classes  was  being  carried 
out  in  western  Ukraine.  The  last  quarter  of  the  cen- 
tury witnessed  a  temporary  eclipse  of  the  Ukrainian 
spirit  of  nationalism. 

8 


The  French  Revolution  released  forces  that  had 
been  imprisoned  in  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  people. 
A  wave  of  nationalistic  feeling  swept  through  Europe, 
bringing  inspiration  to  the  Slavs  as  well  as  to  their 
western  brothers.  Every  branch  of  the  Slavic  race 
awoke  to  a  realization  of  its  history,  its  traditions  and 
its  great  men.  The  Ukrainians  shared  in  this  renais- 
sance. Between  the  revived  nationalism  and  the  spirit 
of  democracy  a  natural  alliance  presently  sprang  up. 
Especially  in  the  Dnieper  district,  there  began  an 
enthusiastic  study  of  the  country's  history,  and  a  peru- 
sal of  old  documents  and  popular  traditions.  The  keen- 
est interest  was  manifested  in  everything  pertaining 
to  ethnography,  philology  and  popular  culture.  It  was 
the  tardy  recognition  of  the  people  as  guardians  of 
national  culture  which  did  much  to  break  down  the  lack 
of  sympathy  which  had*  so  long  prevailed  between  the 
nobles  and  the  lower  classes. 

But  the  Ukrainian  movement  was  confronted  by  a 
bitterly  hostile  Russophile  bureaucracy.  It  is  remark- 
able that  Eusso-Ukrainian  policies  should  have  re- 
mained so  static  from  the  time  of  Peter  the  Great  on- 
ward, while  a  number  of  changes  were  taking  place  in 
Russo-Polish  relations.  Yet  such  was  the  case.  The 
Ukrainian  language  was  restricted  time  and  again. 
Ukrainian  economic  life  was  hampered  in  several  ways. 
The  Ukrainian  serfs,  upon  their  liberation  in  1861,  had 
been  granted  smaller  allotments  than  the  Russian  serfs. 
This  resulted  in  overpopulation  of  the  agricultural  dis- 
tricts, emigration  and  a  high  death  rate.  The  lack  of 
schools  made  remote  the  possibility  of  improving  farm- 
ing methods.  Ukrainian  industry  suffered  a  set-back 
through  the  unfavorable  tariff  policies  adhered  to  by 
the  Russian  government  and  by  the  fact  that  no  banks, 
except  those  with  central  offices  in  Moscow  or  Petro- 
grad,  were  allowed  to  establish  branches  in  Ukraine. 

9 


Nevertheless,  the  nineteenth  century  witnessed  a 
notable  growth  of  Ukrainian  national  feeling.  The 
early  years  of  the  century  constitute  the  period  of 
literary  rebirth.  Then  followed  the  educational  work 
among  the  common  people.  Private  schools  were  or- 
ganized, and  pamphlets  and  books  were  distributed. 
Cultural  organizations  were  formed,  and  a  pronounced 
interest  in  science  was  displayed.  This  entire  revival 
so  alarmed  the  Russian  government  that,  in  1878,  the 
Czar  prohibited  by  ukase  almost  all  publications  in  the 
Ukrainian  language.  Still,  the  literary  impulse  was 
not  suppressed.  It  transferred  itself  to  Eastern  Gal- 
icia  and  Switzerland  and,  in  spite  of  grave  obstacles, 
succeeded  in  winning  for  the  Ukrainian  a  worthy  place 
among  Slavonic  literatures. 

Side  by  side  with  the  cultural  advance,  a  political 
reawakening  of  the  Ukrainian  people  was  taking  place. 
It  was  appreciated  by  the  Ukrainians  that  political 
liberty  for  their  land  and  race  was  expressly  condi- 
tioned upon  the  overthrow  of  the  Czarist  government. 
Accordingly  they  bent  their  efforts  in  that  direction. 
Ukrainians  organized  and  took  a  leading  part  in  the 
Decembrist  uprising  of  1825.  In  the  subsequent  revo- 
lutionary movement  they  were  again  prominent,  and 
two-thirds  of  the  leaders  were  natives  of  Ukraine.  The 
events  of  March,  1917,  were  largely  made  possible  by 
the  Ukrainian  regiments  stationed  in  Petrograd,  who 
refused  any  further  allegiance  to  the  Romanovs  and 
became  supporters  of  the  newly  created  authorities. 
Later  on,  the  Ukrainians  were  the  first  of  the  subject 
nations  of  the  Russian  empire  to  organize  their  own 
government.  On  November  20,  1917,  Ukraine  was 
proclaimed  an  independent  nation  by  the  Central  Rada, 
the  provisional  Ukrainian  parliament.  The  struggle  to 
win  recognition  for  this  independence  is  still  in  prog- 
ress. 

10 


The  expediency  of  Ukraine  ^s  claim  to  exist  as  a  self- 
governing  nation  does  not,  however,  rest  merely  upon 
racial,  ethnological  and  historical  bases.  There  are 
primary  economic  considerations  which  press  for  its 
admittance  to  the  circle  of  free  nations. 

The  Ukrainian  people  inhabit  a  land  330,000  square 
miles  in  extent,  with  a  population  of  45,000,000.  This 
territory  is  not  merely  abundantly  self-supporting, 
but  is,  in  fact,  one  of  the  richest  areas  on  the  earth's 
surface.  Four-fifths  of  the  entire  extent  lie  within  a 
belt  of  deep,  black  earth,  which  produces  bounteous 
crops  of  wheat,  barley,  rye,  oats,  sugar-beets,  fruit, 
tobacco  and  vegtables.  Under  the  Ukrainian  ethno- 
graphic territory  lie  mineral  riches:  coal,  petroleum, 
iron,  manganese,  salt,  phosphate,  kaolin,  graphite  and 
many  other  substances  of  commercial  value. 

In  the  normal  pre-war  period,  Ukraine  used  to  sup- 
ply about  5,000,000  tons  of  grain  for  export  annually. 
Most  of /this  was  wheat.  The  last  three  years,  par- 
ticularly 1919,  have  seen  good  harvests  in  Ukraine.  At 
the  present  moment,  when  western  Europe  is  unable 
to  feed  herself,  Ukraine  has  an  excess  remaining  from 
the  crops  of  1917,  1918  and  1919,  to  an  amount  of  not 
less  than  10,000,000  tons  of  different  kinds  of  grain. 
Besides  this,  the  country  can  guarantee  a  minimum 
yearly  export  of  300,000  to  600,000  tons  of  sugar; 
9,000  tons  of  tobacco ;  17,000  tons  of  sugar-beet  seeds ; 
and  10,000  tons  of  flax  and  hemp  yarn.  Besides  these 
products,  Ukraine  used  to  export  annually  before  the 
war :  65,000  tons  of  eggs ;  6,500  tons  of  raw  hides ;  12,- 
000  tons  of  pork  and  dressed  poultry;  9,000  tons  of 
beef;  240,000  head  of  beef  cattle;  15,000  head  of 
horses;  130,000  hogs;  and  large  quantities  of  wool, 
feathers  and  hops. 

In  minerals,  Ukraine  may  export  in  a  short  time  as 

11 


much  as  100,000  tons  of  manganese  ore  annually ;  500,- 
000  tons  of  iron  ore ;  and  considerable  amounts  of  phos- 
phates, salt  and  soda.  With  reorganization  of  trans- 
portational  facilities,  she  can  furnish  from  6,000,000 
to  10,000,000  tons  of  coal  and  coke,  as  well  as  benzol 
toluol,  anthracen  phenol,  naphthalin  and  other  valuable 
coal  tar  derivatives;  about  90,000  tons  of  coal  tar; 
sulphuric  acid,  ammonium  salts  and  many  other  raw 
and  semi-manufactured  products. 

The  preceding  enumeration  of  the  physical  resources 
of  Ukraine  shows  how  mistaken  is  the  conception  that 
Ukraine  could  not  maintain  an  economic  existence  inde- 
pendent of  Russia.  If  a  country  possessing  such  ex- 
traordinary natural  advantages  and  wealth  as  Ukraine 
cannot  stand  alone,  how  can  one  justify  the  independ- 
ence of  Italy,  Greece,  Poland,  Jugoslavia,  Finland  and 
other  European  nations  whose  right  to  autonomy  is 
not  questioned,  but  whose  natural  endowments  are 
far  less  favorable  to  economic  freedom. 

The  converse  of  the  same  proposition;  viz.,  that 
Russia  cannot  live  Avithout  Ukraine,  will  not  survive 
impartial  criticism.  Although  it  is  quite  clear  that, 
in  reasoning  to  this  end,  other  interests  than  those  of 
Ukraine  supervene,  it  is  nevertheless  worth  while  to 
examine  this  point  of  view  in  order  to  expose  its 
falsity. 

The  three  fundamental  bases  of  opposition  usually 
advanced  are;  (1)  Ukraine  is  the  granary  of  Russia 
and  is  necessary  to  Russia  for  a  large  part  of  her  food 
supply;  (2)  Ukraine  separates  Russia  from  the  Black 
Sea  and  Sea  of  Azov,  thereby  closing  the  outlet  to 
the  Mediterranean;  (3)  Ukraine  possesses  a  supply 
of  coal  and  iron  which  is  necessary  to  Russia. 

The  first  objection  is  refuted  by  an  examination  of 
statistics.    Figures  for  the  years  previous  to  the  war 

12 


show  consistently  that  Ukraine  ^s  exportations  of  cere- 
als to  other  parts  of  the  Russian  empire  did  not  reach 
more  than  10  to  15%  of  her  total  export;  i.  e.,  about 
36,000,000  bushels  annually.  Nearly  all  of  this  was 
destined  for  Poland,  Lithuania  and  White  Ruthenia. 
Russia  proper  never  consumed  more  than  a  very  small 
fraction  of  Ukraine's  grain.  She  did  not  need  it  then 
and  will  not  need  it  in  the  future.  She  is  virtually  self- 
sustaining  in  cereals,  and  the  small  surplus  needed  can 
readily  be  obtained  from  the  fields  of  Siberia  and  the 
region  of  the  Volga. 

The  second  allegation,  that  Russia  needs  the  Ukrain- 
ian ports  on  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Sea  of  Azov,  is 
readily  disposed  of  by  a  reference  to  Russian  maritime 
experience.  The  official  Russian  statistics  of  the  traffic 
of  merchandise  by  rail  show  no  southern  port  which 
served  as  an  outlet  for  the  products  of  the  territories 
situated  north  of  the  ethnic  frontier  of  Ukraine,  with 
the  single  exception  of  Rostov-on-the-Don.  Novoros- 
seysk  was  the  port  used  by  the  Ukrainian  Cossacks  of 
Kuban  and  the  northern  Caucasus.  Up  to  the  present 
time,  Russia  proper  has  depended  almost  exclusively 
upon  the  Baltic  ports.  By  special  treaties  with  the  new 
Baltic  states,  Russia  is  assuring  herself  a  continued 
use  of  their  ports.  There  is  no  reason  why,  if  it  should 
appear  necessary  and  advisable,  a  similar  conciliatory 
^agreement  mth  Ukraine  could  not  arrange  for  a  com- 
\mon  use  of  the  Black  Sea  ports. 

With  regard  to  Ukraine's  coal  resources,  it  is  true 
that  the  Donetz  basin  furnished  70%  of  the  total  coal 
output  of  the  former  Russian  empire,  and  the  Donetz 
basin  is  mostly  within  the  ethnographic  limits  of 
Ukraine.  But  it  is  also  a  fact  that  four-fifths  of  this 
coal  was  consumed  in  Ukraine  itself,  and  that  north- 
western Russia  and  the  Baltic  provinces  never  used 

13 


the  coal  from  the  Donetz  basin,  because  it  could  not 
compete  in  price  with  English  or  German  coal. 
Furthermore,  northern  and  central  Eussia  are  well 
supplied  with  wood  and  peat,  and  with  coal  from  the 
vicinity  of  Moscow.  Ukraine  has  very  little  wood  or 
peat,  and  the  exhaustion  of  the  Donetz  basin  for  the 
sake  of  Eussian  industries  would  leave  her  without  fuel 
resources.  The  Urals  and  Siberia,  too,  are  supplied 
Avith  local  coal,  while  in  the  Kuznetsky  district  in  west 
Siberia  are  vast  deposits,  scarcely  worked  as  yet  be- 
cause of  the  lack  of  railway  lines  into  Siberia. 

The  iron  fields  of  the  Urals  and  of  other  provinces  of 
Eussia  proper  have  not  been  extensively  exploited,  and 
before  the  war  Ukraine  did  indeed  furnish  three- 
fourths  of  all  the  iron  supply  of  the  former  Eussian 
empire.  But  the  beds  of  iron  ore  in  Ukraine  are  not 
very  large,  and  it  would  be  erroneous  to  assume  that 
they  could  adequately  supply  the  needs  of  all  Eussia 
for  any  long  period  of  time.  In  any  case,  it  is  safe  to 
conclude  that,  if  the  metallurgical  development  of 
Eussia  is  continued  and  her  mines  consistently  worked, 
she  mil  be  entirely  able  to  get  along  without  iron  im- 
ports from  Ukraine. 

Finally,  there  is  no  obstacle  to  permanent  economic 
co-operation  of  Ukraine  and  Eussia,  and  brisk  commer- 
cial dealings  between  the  two  independent  states.  But 
political  disentanglement  is  a  first  requisite.  The 
richness  of  Ukraine  has  always  made  it  a  tempting 
region  for  exploitation  by  neighboring  states.  This  is 
more  than  ever  true  today.  If  such  exploitation  is  not 
to  be  carried  on  at  the  expense  of  and  to  the  detriment 
of  the  Ukrainian  people,  a  separate  state  organization 
is  necessary  to  assume  protection  over  their  economic 
interests. 

It  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized   that   a   free 

14 


Ukraine  does  irot  imply  an  economically  isolated 
Ukraine.  Constant  traffic  with  friendly  foreign  powers 
is  desired  by  all  the  Ukrainian  political  parties* 
Ukraine  lacks  machinery,  capital  and  trained  experts. 
The  railroad  question  is  of  enormous  importance.  Be- 
fore the  Eevolution,  all  of  the  rail  lines  of  Ukraine 
yielded  considerable  profits,  especially  those  known  as 
the  Southwestern  Eailroads.  But  Russia  did  not  see 
fit  to  use  this  income  in  the  construction  of  further 
roads  and,  as  a  result,  Ukraine  possesses  a  very  incon- 
siderable network  of  railroads :  only  about  11,115  miles. 
This  is  much  less  than  the  country  needs.  The  war  al- 
most completely  wrecked  and  demoralized  even  this 
inadequate  transportational  system.  The  railroads 
must  be  rebuilt,  and  the  insufficiently  developed  public 
highways  must  be  improved  and  extended.  The  regula- 
tion of  navigable  rivers  is  another  matter  of  great  im- 
portance, and  the  vast  available  power  possibilities  of 
the  rapids  of  the  Dnieper  and  other  streams  must  be  ex- 
ploited. Central  power  stations  must  be  erected,  new 
methods  introduced  in  mining,  grain  elevators  built 
and  agriculture,  milling,  sugar  refining  and  other  in- 
dustries given  an  upward  impetus  by  the  application 
of  scientific  management  and  fresh  capital. 

Inability  to  contest  the  force  of  the  foregoing  historic 
and  economic  considerations  has  led  certain  foes  of 
Ukrainian  independence  to  make  the  assertion  that  the 
Ukrainian  national  movement  is  artificially  stimulated 
and  does  not  receive  support  from  the  masses  of  the 
population.  This  contention  is  controverted  by  the 
most  obvious  facts.  For  more  than  two  years  the 
Ukrainians  have  been  actively  fighting  for  their  lib- 
erty, in  spite  of  almost  incredible  obstacles.  They  have 
had  no  support  from  any  foreign  source  in  this  strug- 
gle; they  were  attacked  at  one  and  the  same  time  by 


35 


the  Bolsheviki  and  anti-Bolsheviki ;  they  were  block- 
aded :  they  were  unable  to  secure  ammunition  or  sani- 
tary supplies.  They  did  not  give  up,  because  they  re- 
alized that  the  question  was  one  of  life  or  death.  No 
other  nation  in  modern  times  has  fought  for  its  inde- 
pendence under  such  difficult  circumstances,  and  none 
has  expressed  its  desire  for  freedomi^ore  strongly. 
The  plebiscite  of  blood  is  the  most  sincere  evidence  of 
the  will  to  self-determination. 

However,  prolonged  and  stubborn  fighting  has  not 
been  the  only  way  in  w^hich  the  Ukrainian  people  have 
shown  their  desire  to  be  free.  They  have  had  several 
opportunities  to  manifest  their  wish  in  a  more  peace- 
ful and  regular  manner.  Thus,  the  Central  Rada, 
which  represented  all  classes  of  Ukrainians,  and  in- 
cluded in  addition  representatives  of  the  various  non- 
Ukrainian  nationalities  in  the  land,  proclaimed 
Ukraine's  independence  in  1917.  When,  in  December 
of  the  same  year,  the  Bolshevik  propagandists  ques- 
tioned the  representative  character  of  the  Central 
Rada,  a  general  congress  of  the  workers  and  peasants 
of  Ukraine  was  called,  and  this  congress,  chosen  after 
the  Bolshevik  method,  made  haste  to  affirm  its  support 
of  the  Central  Rada  by  a  vote  of  2,000  to  70.  Thei'e 
w^as  also  in  1917  a  formal  election  of  deputies  to  the 
All-Russian  Constituent  Assembly.  Ukraine  elected 
230  deputies  in  all.  Of  those,  75%  or  175  members, 
were  Ukrainian  nationalists. 

After  the  overthrow  of  the  pro-German  Hetman 
Skoropadsky  in  1918,  and  assumption  of  authority  by 
the  Directorate,  even  the  Ukrainian  communists  de- 
clared themselves  in  favor  of  a  free  Ukraine  and  pro- 
tested to  the  Russian  Soviet  Government  against  its 
proposed  invasion.  Their  protest  went  unheeded,  and 
when  the  Russian  Bolsheviki  occupied  Kiev  and  en- 

16 


deavored  to  impose  their  system  upon  Ukraine,  they 
found  no  Ukrainians  who  were  willing  to  co-operate 
with  them.  The  result  was  a  so-called  *^  Ukrainian 
Soviet  Government,"  which  is  in  reality  anything  but 
Ukrainian.  The  head  is  a  Roumanian,  Rakovsky,  and 
the  regime  is  nothing  but  a  local  agency  of  the  Moscow 
government. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  the  Government  of  the  Ukrain- 
ian People's  Republic,  headed  by  General  Petlura, 
which  I  have  the  honor  to  represent,  is  the  only  gov- 
ernment which  the  Ukrainian  people  have  been  willing 
to  support.  On  the  other  hand,  they  have  revolted 
against  all  foreign  invaders  who  have  attempted  to  im- 
pose their  own  rule  upon  the  Ukrainians.  The 
Germans,  the  Bolsheviki  and  the  forces  of  General 
Denikin  all  met  with  vigorous  resistance.  If  now  the 
Polish  forces  are  in  Ukraine  and  the  population  does 
not  oppose  them,  it  is  because  the  Poles  are  acting  in 
conjunction  with  the  Ukrainian  forces  under  Petlura, 
as  their  allies. 

It  is  also  necessary  to  consider  the  opinion  enter- 
tained in  some  circles  that  an  independent  Ukraine 
must  inevitably  fall  under  the  influence  of  Germany 
and  become  a  German  outpost  in  eastern  Europe.  The 
reason  generally  advanced  as  a  basis  for  this  suspicion 
is  that  Ukraine  concluded  a  separate  peace  -with 
Germany  in  February,  1918,  at  Brest  Litovsk.  In  this 
connection,  it  should  be  remembered  that  Roumania, 
too,  concluded  a  separate  peace  with  Germany.  Yet 
Roumania  has  continued  to  be  considered  an  ally  of 
Germany's  opponents,  and  it  is  everywhere  recognized 
that  she  only  negotiated  with  Germany  because  of  the 
bitter  fact  that  she  was  forced  to  do  so.  Ukraine  was 
in  far  worse  condition  than  Roumania  when  she  con- 
cluded her  peace  with   Germany.    Roumania   had   at 

17 


least  an  organized  state  and  a  loyal  army.  Ukraine  ^s 
government  was  in  its  infancy,  its  state  organization 
was  slight,  and  its  army  consisted  chiefly  of  the  rem- 
nants of  the  demoralized  Eussian  forces.  The  Ukrain- 
ian leaders  were  faced  by  several  wars ;  on  the  one  hand 
by  the  war  with  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Turkey 
and  Bulgaria ;  and  now  on  the  other,  by  the  new  conflict 
with  the  Russian  Soviet  Government.  Under  the  cir- 
cumstances, Ukraine  had  to  choose  between  submitting 
entirely  to  the  Bolsheviki,  in  which  case  the  country 
would  be  over-run  by  Germans  anyway,  or  making  any 
kind  of  outright  peace  with  Germany  and  then  hoping 
for  the  best. 

Subsequent  events  proved  that  Germany  never  had 
any  interest  in  a  permanently  independent  Ukraine. 
Toward  the  end  of  the  war,  she  was  in  desperate  need 
of  foodstuffs.  Today  she  wants,  not  merely  foods,  but 
also  a  new  and  fruitful  field  for  banking,  commercial 
exploitation  and  the  sale  of  German  goods.  Germany 
has  grown  to  consider  eastern  Europe  as  a  natural 
market  for  her  products.  What  she  wants  is  a  Greater 
Russia,  whether  it  be  Czarist,  Bolshevist  or  Constitu- 
tional. Under  the  circumstances,  it  is  more  plausible 
to  suspect  the  Germans  of  plotting  to  re-establish 
'^Russia,  one  and  indivisible, ' '  than  to  regard  them  as 
friendly  to  a  free  Ukraine. 

At  the  present  moment,  the  recognition  of  the 
Ukrainian  People's  Republic  is  a  matter  of  inter- 
national expediency,  because  there  can  be  no  peace  in 
eastern  Europe  as  long  as  Ukraine  is  subjected  to  any 
neighboring  nation.  Proposals  to  deal  with  the 
Ukrainian  people  as  if  they  had  no  moral  right  to  self- 
determination  are  an  obvious  contradiction  to  the 
principles  enunciated  by  President  "Wilson  at  the  time 
of  America's  entrance  into  the  war  against  Germany 


18 


and  her  allies.  The  attempt  to  carry  them  into  effect 
can  only  result  in  continued  unrest  in  eastern  Europe. 
The  relegation  of  all  Ukraine  to  Eussia  would  mean  at 
best  the  arbitrary  compulsion  of  the  Ukrainians  to  a 
federation  which,  if  advisable,  should  come  at  their 
own  instance  and  of  their  own  free  will ;  not  because  of 
outside  pressure.  At  worst,  it  would  renew  their  ser- 
vitude. The  partition  of  the  country  between  Poland 
and  Russia  will  not  only  produce  continued  restless- 
ness and  discontent  within  Ukraine  itself,  but  will  also 
continuously  tempt  Poland  and  Russia  to  make  war  on 
one  another,  in  order  to  extend  their  respective  spheres 
of  influence.  An  independent  Ukrainian  state,  on  the 
contrary,  would  establish  a  balance  of  power  in  east- 
ern Europe,  which  must  be  regarded  as  the  surest 
guarantee  of  peace  in  that  portion  of  the  world. 

The  foregoing  statement  covers,  in  outline  form,  the 
main  grounds  upon  which  Ukraine  bases  her  claim  to 
independence.  This  memorandum  is  presented  to  you, 
Mr.  Secretary,  in  the  hope  that  the  Ukrainian  situation 
will  be  thoroughly  examined,  and  it  is  my  earnest  belief 
that  a  careful  study  of  Ukrainian  affairs  will  sustain 
the  request  for  recognition  of  the  Ukrainian  People's 
Republic  which  I  have  the  honor  herewith  to  submit. 

I  am,  my  dear  Sir, 

Your  very  obedient  servant, 

JULIAE-  BaTCHINSKY, 

Diplomatic  Representative  of  the 

Ukrainian  People^ s  Republic. 


y  ^ 


OTHER  PAMPHLETS  PUBLISHED 
BY 

THE  FRIENDS  OF  UKRAINE 


1 .  Bolshevism  and  Ukraine.     Two  cents. 

2.  Ukraine,  Poland  and  Russia  and  the  Right  of  the 

Free  Disposition  of  Peoples.  By  S.  Shelukhin. 
Ten  cents. 

3.  Protest  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic  to  the  United 

States  Against  the  Delivery  of  Eastern  Galicia 
to  Polish  Domination.     Ten  cents. 

4.  The  Jewish  Pogroms  in  Ukraine.  By  Julian  Batchin- 

sky,  Israel  Zangwill  and  others.     Ten  cents. 

5.  Ukraine  and  Russia.    By  Woldemar  Timoshenko, 

Vice  Director  of  the  Economic  Institute  at  the 
Academy  of  Sciences  of  Ukraine.   Ten  cents. 

6.  What  About  Ukraine?  Elditorials  of  New  Orleans 

Times- Picayune,  N.  Y.  Times  and  N.  Y.  Tribune. 
Five  cents. 

7.  Trade  With  Ukraine.     Ukraine's  Natural  Wealth, 

Needs  and  Commercial  Opportunities;  The 
Ukrainian  Co-operative  Societies  and  Their  In- 
fluence.    By  Elmil  Revyuk.     Ten  cents. 

8.  Inhuman  Blockade  Strangling  a   Nation.      Letters 

and  Messages  from  Stricken  Ukraine.  Ten  cents. 

9.  Ukraine    and  the    Ukrainians.     A  Handbook  of 

Concise  Information  Regarding  the  Country, 
People,  History  and  Industry  of  Ukraine.  By 
Emil  Revyuk.     Ten  cents. 

Address  all  communications  to 

FRIENDS  OF  UKRAINE 

345  Munsey  Building     ::     ::     ::     Washington,  D.  C. 


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